The approximately 400 ‘diplomats’ that had been declared persona non grata was seen as a dramatic reduction of the Kremlin’s espionage capability. This number for the first time put the estimated total at 800 identified spies that had been stationed in Russia’s European embassies and consulates.
At the time it was also said that the number of ‘illegals’, working without diplomatic cover (and without immunity to arrest) was relatively smaller.
Now the unexpected drawn-out battle with Ukraine and the latter’s staunch determination to fully rid the country of the foreign invader has drained Russia of the supply of crucial hi-tech components, vital to produce much of its military hardware.
Sanctions have exposed Russia’s dependence on foreign intellectual property, its lack of production capacity and foreign aversion to investing. For instance, it’s reported that kamikaze drones have been supplied by Iran, which is also willing to supply missiles. Iran has denied this.
Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, has been instructed to mitigate the effects of the sanctions. This is nothing new for Russian spies abroad, since the Soviet era KGB was directly tasked with stealing technological secrets from the West. Hi-tech has always been a priority target for the Kremlin.
Putin emphasized the importance of this re-focusing of efforts recently at the 100th anniversary of Russia’s ‘illegals program’ at SVR headquarters. This includes Russian agents – moles and sleepers – living abroad illegally without any diplomatic protection.
Over the past decade, this sector of Russian operatives abroad has had some setbacks, including the arrest of 10 il-legals in the US and the closure of the Seattle and San Francisco consulates, which were situated in prime locations for targeting tech companies.
This has forced the SVR to boost its cyber-enabled espionage, including the targeting of individuals and organizations that offer political and foreign policy insights. But they haven’t abandoned humint, intelligence gathering through human contact. After the invasion, a definite increase in agent recruitment was noticed in Europe.
In Estonia, for instance, it’s been observed that Russian secret services have attempted to recruit those capable of supplying information on Estonia’s border, specifically how easy would it be to penetrate. And, according to Estonian officials, ‘influence’ operations had also significantly increased.
Obviously, Estonian authorities are concerned that unwitting citizens could be turned into spies tasked by the Russians to escalate tensions, destabilize protests, take photographs of military infrastructure, or supply Russia with information on the British-led NATO mission, now substantially augmented in size.
(It must be noted that any possible attempts recently to foment significant disturbance at possible protests against the recent removal of Soviet-era monuments have abjectly failed.)
In Estonia, signs have been placed at border crossings – presumably for individuals travelling into Russia, often visiting relatives – with advice on how to avoid Russian and Belorussian intelligence services’ recruitment approaches. They also instruct people to inform Estonian authorities when these recruitment undertakings occur.
Russia is known for focussing on foreigners while in the country. In 2021, Russia introduced free online visas for travellers from 53 countries to visit Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. This obviously makes it easier for those intending to travel, but hesitant about the effort in applying for a visitor’s visa.
As is known, visa facilitation helps to increase foreign travellers and is particularly useful to Russian intelligence services. Searching for possible individuals to be approached, visa applications are screened and those who may have usable information are red-flagged. Prime targets would be former or current politicians, business people, military and media personnel, law enforcement officials and, due to the urgent needs of the military industry, high-tech specialists.
Some western countries have issued travel advisories (not travel bans) for its own citizens planning on travel to Russia. But we’re reminded that over 25 million ethnic Russians live in the West. These are mostly compatriots who haven’t left Russia in fear and disgust, as tens of thousands have now, and may have relatives at home. They (many of whom are citizens of their country of residence) would most likely be the prime subjects for initial contact. But others have certainly not been abandoned by ‘talent’ spotters.
To those who cannot avoid travel to Russia should be mindful of advice from counterintelligence veterans: travel in groups at all times, don’t become isolated from others; don’t break any laws, even the most insignificant; avoid inebriation – Russians have the reputation of downing healthy sized vodka shooters; don’t supply false information to Russian officials; make sure visa application info is accurate and factual; don’t bring primary mobile devices or computers to Russia.
And of course, don’t accept offers or agree to requests and be mindful of friendly, likeable new acquaintances. Simple advice, sometimes difficult to follow.
(More of this in near future.)
