Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and honourable members of the committee, for inviting me to testify before you today on this landmark national security legislation. I would like to commend the all-party support that this legislation has received and your shared urgency to pass it.
I’m a journalist and civil society activist who has been researching and exposing foreign information and influence operations targeting Canada and our allies for nearly 15 years.
I am also a human rights activist. Through this work, I’ve had the privilege of supporting and collaborating with extraordinarily courageous champions of democracy and human rights, some of whom testified before this committee earlier this week. Others have faced intimidation or detention for speaking out against the totalitarian regimes in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. Some have been poisoned, and others brutally murdered for their activism and advocacy.
For my work in supporting many of those brave activists, and our common causes, I have directly witnessed and experienced the chilling effects of foreign authoritarian transnational repression.
These include death threats, harassment, and defamatory articles regularly published by Kremlin-controlled media outlets. Kremlin-aligned influencers and proxies in Canada have attempted to discredit and silence me through psychological intimidation and whisper campaigns.
The psychological impact of being targeted, and then defending against such foreign influence operations is, by design, exhausting.
While my personal experiences are less severe than those of witnesses you’ve heard from – such as the brave members of the Uyghur, Tibetan, and Hong Kong communities – the objectives of these influence operations are universal: to repress the free and open expression of regime critics within the Canadian political and media environment and ultimately to undermine our democracy.
These operations aim to cast doubt on the credibility of their victims. Tactics may include malicious online articles or poisoned letter-writing campaigns containing false accusations about the target, sent to media, government officials, and even the victim’s employers. In my case, such campaigns were carried out by Canadians working with Russian companies, trade promotion organizations, and Kremlin-controlled think tanks.
The psychological impact of being targeted, and then defending against such foreign influence operations is, by design, exhausting. Victims feel isolated and defenseless. Concern for the safety of family members creates additional psychological stress – all of which is made worse when these campaigns include threats of physical violence. This can lead to significant psychological trauma and further problems. Ultimately, the target becomes so overwhelmed that they give up and silence themselves – limiting their ability to freely express themselves.
For Canadians vulnerable to transnational repression, C-70 is a welcome ray of hope in our common cause to defend our democracy against authoritarian regimes that seek to undermine it.
The lack of a coherent support system for vulnerable communities compounds the problem.
In 2019, when my family and I were targets of death threats sent from a Moscow-based IP address and on social media, no law enforcement organization was equipped to comprehensively deal with the issue of transnational repression. When I called my local law enforcement unit, they told me to contact the RCMP. When I contacted the RCMP, they told me to contact CSIS. CSIS was a dead end.
When C-70 comes into force, all parliamentarians need to support the development of policies that provide meaningful support for vulnerable communities and the brave activists and journalists who become victims of transnational repression.
For Canadians vulnerable to transnational repression, C-70 is a welcome ray of hope in our common cause to defend our democracy against authoritarian regimes that seek to undermine it.
The transparency and accountability required by the foreign influence transparency registry will help ensure that dishonest Canadians, who are lured into the service of foreign authoritarian regimes with lucrative opportunities, are identified. This will allow government officials, media, and vulnerable communities to be aware of who and what these individuals publicly represent.
When properly enforced, this new law will help prevent them from manipulating our political and information environment.
Our foreign adversaries spare no expense in their efforts to undermine our democracy.
However, I believe that the act would be further strengthened by a definition of both physical and digital transnational repression, and that such activity targeting vulnerable diaspora community groups, and human rights and pro-democracy defenders should be included in the act and the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.
Our foreign adversaries spare no expense in their efforts to undermine our democracy.
Until now, they have manipulated our information spaces, influenced policy, and intimidated our brave front-line defenders of democracy with relative impunity. Properly implemented and enforced, C-70 will end their impunity and provide a new bulwark to defend our democracy.
In conclusion, C-70 represents a critically important step forward in protecting our democracy from the insidious threats posed by foreign authoritarian regimes. Its implementation will not only enhance transparency and accountability but also offer much-needed support to those of us on the front lines of defending human rights and democratic values. As we move forward, it is imperative that we continue to refine and strengthen this legislation to address both physical and digital forms of transnational repression.
By doing so, we can ensure that Canada remains a bastion of freedom and democracy, resilient against those who seek to undermine it. Thank you once again for the opportunity to speak before you today.
