The opponents of dual citizenship have questioned whether that policy actually decreases the feeling of national identity, influences alienation from the process and blocks cultural assimilation. Maintaining a dynamic national identity and culture is seen as a need to counter rising tension between mainstream and migrant communities.
Critics of dual citizenship maintain that a second citizenship can be obtained too easily: one can still retain all the privileges and rights of the first citizenship – country of origin – such as healthcare, retirement funds, job opportunities, public benefits, welfare etc. A second citizenship, the say, diminishes the essence of being a citizen and does not evoke the emotional, psychological changes that should occur when one goes through the naturalization process.
In other words, a second citizenship, they insist simply becomes a convenience and an easy way to improve one's economic potential. It can be simply discarded when it no longer brings in any benefits.
On the other hand, supporters of the dual citizenship concept point out that it actually promotes political participation by allowing immigrants to participate who are reluctant to give up their country of origin either out of loyalty or to a feeling of alienation from the mainstream because of ethnicity, language, culture, religion etc.
It's argued that dual citizenship for Estonian would be self-defeating for those that want the tiny country's culture to survive. It's been argued that dual citizenship may be viewed as having dual loyalty, having the potential to act contrary to a government's interests. This may lead, for instance, to difficulties in acquiring government employment where security clearance may be required.
It's said that dual citizenship would give Putin's Compatriots' Program a greatly enhanced political environment in which to operate. (But due to the changes in the enforcement of Russian citizenship legislation, many Russians living abroad will be stripped of their Russian citizenship.) Opponents of dual citizenship argue that it would give naturalized Estonian citizens, still fervently loyal to Moscow significant clout in the electoral process to bring the Kremlin's voice into Estonia's public and parliamentary dialogue in a seemingly legitimate manner. But opponents conveniently forget that dual citizenship in Estonia would only include those that already qualify for Estonian citizenship through birthright.
But what are the actual numbers that support such a claim? Fully 84.2 percent of the residents of Estonia are citizens of the country. Seven percent are citizens of Russia. It's impossible to prove that having citizenship of a country means adhering to an unswerving loyalty to the country. To many former Russian citizens who have become naturalized Estonian citizens it's likely to mean a certain distancing from mother Russia albeit probably because of the attractiveness of the EU as compared to the Russian Federation.
Unofficially about ten members of parliament could be identified as having ethnic roots in the Russian speaking community. They certainly do not vote as a block when faced with issues pertaining to official language questions, foreign policy, relationship with Russia etc. Politically they are not a homogenous group. Currently with an increased Russian language voter base in Estonia, Russia cannot be said to have increased its leverage in the political competition of the country.
This public debate will continue for some time to come.
Laas Leivat
