Russia’s egregious abuse of Interpol’s info-sharing services is boldfaced harassment, but still mild compared to the Kremlin’s more aggressive transnational repression activities abroad. It relies on assassination, targeting former government insiders and all others considered to be threats to the Putin regime.
Augmenting the elimination of likely opponents is the control of key cultural institutions active abroad, thus influencing the diaspora. Preventing exiles from reaching domestic audiences with a counter-Kremlin narrative is a priority. The Kremlin has thus reassured itself that opposition activities abroad are not a danger if they lack domestic influence.
More important, Russian rabble-rousers in foreign locations aren’t a threat provided they’re not affiliated with foreign intelligence services.
Observers see this as the Kremlin’s lack of ambition to make “overseas Russians” an overt tool of state control and power – as along as they don’t attempt to feed anti-Kremlin sentiment among compatriots at home. More important, Russian rabble-rousers in foreign locations aren’t a threat provided they’re not affiliated with foreign intelligence services.
The Kremlin’s ‘political warfare’ targets include those who may have defected to NATO states…
Those who are identified as a genuine menace become targets of the clandestine services’ ‘mokroye delo’ (wet affairs) capabilities. Although China appears to focus on a wide spectrum of dissidents abroad for harassment and intimidation, it’s suggested Russia fixes in on a narrower range but undertakes a more violent solution. Russia, more than any other state, uses assassination as a tool of transnational repression – at least ten from 2014 to 2021 summer. This total is insignificant when compared to outright domestic assassinations, disappearances and ‘suicides’ from tall buildings inside Russia.
The Kremlin’s ‘political warfare’ targets include those who may have defected to NATO states, those who are known to have fought against Russia (Chechens for instance) or business people who have run afoul of the FSB, SVR or GRU. Numerous high-profile, wealthy Russians abroad have been victims.
How effective is this liquidation campaign? Russia continues to deny its culpability. The evidence in many cases is unambiguous – sometimes the only linkage with Russia is that the alleged radioactive isotopes and nerve agents used are only available to the Russian government and its agencies.
Supplementing the elimination of a political enemy, these covert operations send messages to serious Kremlin opponents.
But the ripple effects of the assassination attempts are said to be the motivation for Moscow. Supplementing the elimination of a political enemy, these covert operations send messages to serious Kremlin opponents.
The key pillars of the organized community in exile – independent Russian language media, Russian cultural organizations, the Russian Orthodox Church – must be under the line of command of related domestic institutions – in reality, controlled by the Russian government.
Authority was clearly established when the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad recognized once again the supremacy of the Moscow Patriarchy in 2006. Bolstering the domination of Russia-based institutions, Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs), Compatriots Living Abroad and International Human Cooperation were launched. These were all meant to improve engagement with diaspora groups.
Russia’s blending of ‘soft’ with ‘hard’ power has produced campaigns with multiple targets and numerous audiences, especially since the invasion of Ukraine.
It was part of “soft power” in practice, formally enabled by legislation years ago, which aimed not only to control compatriots abroad, but also ‘defend’ them and use them to promote the Kremlin’s policies internationally.
Unfortunately, liberal democracies have been lax in protecting the rights and liberties of Russian dissidents, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status.
Russia’s blending of ‘soft’ with ‘hard’ power has produced campaigns with multiple targets and numerous audiences, especially since the invasion of Ukraine. Unfortunately, liberal democracies have been lax in protecting the rights and liberties of Russian dissidents, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status.
Compounding this is the servile mentality of authoritarian regimes, especially in the ‘stan’ countries on Russia’s southern border. With their craven pro-Moscow policies, they hope to win favours that provide them dividends for stability. This is not only a moral travesty for them, but also a strategic miscalculation in the long-term.
The current prognosis for relations with Moscow for NATO members is gloomy. Surely support for Russian exiled activists, journalists and democracy-promoting groups is an indispensable investment for a post-Putin Russia.
