It pursues these goals operating both clandestinely as well as openly.
Russia's compatriots program, says Kazocins is its most seemingly active tool in this pursuit. The ten-year-old program is generously financed, well co-ordinated and perceived as a legitimate operational tool within Russia. Kazocins stressed that the wellbeing of Russian compatriots abroad is not important to the Kremlin, but their potential in using them for gaining influence is paramount. The Latvian SAB (Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution) has the same counter-intelligence responsibilities as Estonia's Kapo, but does not investigate criminal matters which Kapo does.
At a conference in Stockholm recently, named ‘Security Around the Baltic States 2013' Kazocins stressed that Russia wants to restore its former superpower status, a fundamental goal of its security and foreign policy. Its ‘centuries long paranoia' won't allow it to abandon its strategic depth and as it feels endangered after the collapse of the Soviet empire.
Lithuania's State Security Department in its recent annual report once again stated that Russian intelligence agencies as being the most aggressive and active in the country. Added to this, in Lihtuania, is the additional activity of Belarus' special services. In addition to targeting strategic energy projects, foreign affairs, economic, military objectives etc., the Russian and Belarus services are busy in influencing Lithuania's political sector. The Russian FSB was developing contacts in government, political parties, the press, academics, high tech and ethnic minorities.
The Russian services have become so bold as to harass Russian political opposition members at a conference in Vilnius this June. The Russian anti-Putin participants claimed that they were followed, filmed and intimidated by FSB operatives under cover as journalists. In fact the opposition members said they felt as if they were in a suburb of Moscow and that the Kremlin is broadening its fight against any opposition from its own territory to all of Europe. Indeed the use of the FSB, which is meant for domestic security is employed outside Russian borders as if neighbouring sovereign countries were part of ‘Russia's backyard'.
(Ironically Belarus' security agency the KGB (yes, the same acronym as it was in Russia) reported last summer that they had broken up a Lithuanian spy ring that was infiltrating the country's military and joint security system with Russia. Members of the spy ring were reported to be citizens of Belarus. The KGB stated that some of the spy ring members had confessed. Very convenient to say the least.
Estonia's Kapo in its annual report this spring also stressed the heightened activity of Russian influence operations in Estonia, not only through its compatriots program but also using ‘soft power' tactics. This usually is meant to include a passive stance in which the country's cultural, social and political values are themselves attractive enough for foreign countries to emulate. Developing friendly relations that may include reciprocal influence derives from an understanding and appreciation of the other country's value system, its adherence to fair play, human rights etc. The Kremlin's understanding of ‘soft power' stresses that the initiator actively promotes its culture, language, sports, education, foreign assistance etc. accompanied with a message of Russian benevolence and superiority in these areas. As Margaret Thatcher once commented: “If you have to insist that you are a lady, then you are not.”
However to build and consolidate a base for influence operations, neither ‘soft power' tactics not modern electronic interventions are sufficient for progress. Old-fashioned recruitment is ultimately required. Russian clandestine services are still predictably aggressive in recruitment and amongst other tools compromising information is often used.
Normally, before an approach is attempted a full background rundown is compiled. Heightened risks for the targeted individual are his weaknesses and emotional state: disappointments at work, financial problems, alcohol consumption, disloyalties, tendency towards violence, gambling etc. For the older generation a sure-fire guarantor of recruitment success would be the threat of exposing his/her former secret working relationship with the KGB or Soviet military intelligence.
In the case of veteran Kapo officer Aleksei Dressen, convicted last year of being a double agent for Russia, the FSB used as a recruitment tool his failure to notify his superiors in Kapo of the first FSB approach to him. Dressen's casual demeanour and seeming lack of initiative for his new overlords just after being recruited probably indicated a thoroughly planned operation with long term goals.
One must note that of the three Russian intelligence agencies, the FSB tasked specifically with domestic security responsibilities is much more active than the SVR (foreign intelligence) or GRU (military intelligence) agencies in Estonia. This clearly indicates that Russian clandestine services have a total disdain for the fact that the former Soviet occupied countries are unassailably independent and not part of Russia or a theoretical Soviet Union. (To be cont'd.)
Laas Leivat
