We’ve been aware of it all along: “We know our neighbour. … It’s Russia’s classic playbook – taken straight from the KGB,” says Estonian PM Kaja Kallas.
What assures us that the plans are authentic and not a Western ruse to justify the reinforcement of the Baltics’ military deterrence? Because, among other expert scrutinizers, the London-based Dossier Centre, Lithuania’s broadcaster LRT, Latvia’s Re:Baltic, Estonian Delfi, Poland’s Front Story, Süddeutsche Zeitung, German radio networks WDR and NDR, the Kyiv Independent, and Central European Front Square, Expressen, and others have trust in their authenticity.
Developed by the Putin regime’s ‘Directorate for Cross-Border Co-operation’ in 2021, the leaked documents betray Moscow’s intentions to block the establishment of NATO military bases, weaken neighbouring democracies, bolster Russian culture and language, and influence and empower pro-Kremlin political groupings. The Directorate is staffed by Russian intelligence specialists from all three services – the FSB, GRU and SVR covering domestic/political, military and foreign aspects of the plans respectively.
With the invasion of Ukraine, these plans may have lost their real-time validity, but they reinforce the necessity of heightened vigilance and military preparedness. Although some analysts claim that Russia intends to stop the erosion of its influence and aims to re-establish its former ‘sphere of influence’, for others this is a short-sighted interpretation. We cannot dismiss Hungary in 1956, Czechosolovakia in 1968 and the current attack against Ukraine. Putin is more reckless and determined than any of his predecessors.
The political/military/security and trade/economic-related plans for each country are customized. But the society/culture-related aspects differ, depending on the specific strategic interests of Russia for each Baltic state.
Observers have for years contended that Russia’s ‘compatriots’ program has considered language and culture as crucial to their influence activities. Russia has always claimed to be the patron of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers worldwide, irrespective of their citizenship. And thus, it holds the right to “protect” them militarily. This proactive outreach is handled not only by the Foreign Ministry, but also its related agencies such as Rosso-trudnichestvo and the Rusky Mir (Russian World) Foundation. Both had branches all over in Europe, which were closed due to sanctions.
Both Estonia and Latvia have recently legislated language reforms by which only the Estonian language will eventually be prime language of instruction in government funded kindergartens and primary schools. Extensive Russian classes will remain as options.
The plans call for Estonia to be the target of Russia’s “propaganda of Russian culture”. This would include the nurturing of a Russian orientation and motivating “talented Russian speaking youth” in Russian universities.
Latvia is the target for more specific goals. A school situated at Russia’s foreign mission in Riga would help to preserve and improve the status of Russian literature, culture, language and education in the country. Analysts however see the school as a centre for talent-spotting and recruiting spies and agents of influence.
Another goal in the leaked documents, specifically for Estonia, is “countering the attempts of anti-Russian Estonian political forces to falsify history”. Thus, mourning the loss of independence in 1940, condemning Soviet occupation, extolling anti-Soviet partisan resistance, the 2007 relocation of the “Bronze Soldier”, the celebration of regained independence in 1991 and other themes – these are all seen as part of the Estonian national identity. But the Kremlin views them as “glorifying Nazism”.
Looming with vastly superior firepower over the Baltic states, Russia has yet to weaken the countries’ determination to stay independent and democratic. Estonia is recognized as a leading international innovator of cyber-security. Augmenting this is the recognition of Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service’s superior signals-penetration ability, in intercepting Russian communications.
In addition, the Estonians are wary of Russian influence operations and espionage. Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some 600 Russian diplomats have been expelled from the EU to date, 36 from Estonia alone, making its efforts proportionally one of the most efficient.
Fueling pro-Russian sympathies in Estonian society has been a Kremlin goal for decades. Coupled with this is countering nationalist attitudes and establishing groups that foster cooperation with Russia.
A specific short-term goal was to work with local businessmen by inviting them to the large Russian market which will open if Tallinn reverts to a more pro-Moscow stance. Estonian intelligence sees this as viable strategy for Russia, since an entrepreneur’s orientation is profit-based and long term, whereas politicians depend on votes that are often fickle and lack staying power. A politician without votes loses the power to influence, but businessmen with financial clout have their own interests top-of-mind over the long haul.
One of the Kremlin’s consistent strategies has been to weaken enemies from the inside, create conflicts within communities, polarize societies. One may legitimately ask, can Moscow claim certain credit for some success in Estonia with these aspects? Since some Western analysts conclude that very few Kremlin strategists actually believe that the Baltic states can be coerced back into the Russian fold, a more realistic plan would have been to stoke the flames of internal discord to keep Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from being solidly entrenched in NATO..
The attack against Ukraine squelched even that ambition, but serious divisions remain. We know who helps to enlarge them.
