My paper highlights the importance of Euro-Atlantic institutions in offering clear and genuine opportunities for Ukraine to join in the near future, or risk the undermining and regression of democratic freedoms earnt to date.
I first presented my ideas at the Eurasiatique launch event and again at the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies conference at Cambridge University. I will modify my findings and present them to an Estonian and, indeed, a wider Baltic audience at the Eighth Annual Tartu Conference in Estonia.
My paper looks at the story of democratic development in Ukraine and Georgia and how recent backsliding in the latter serves as a cautionary tale of what could happen in the former. However, these sentiments are not primarily aimed at domestic actors but at NATO and the EU. These developments did not occur in a vacuum but were heavily influenced by broader geopolitical currents. The USSR's collapse and the ensuing chaos were followed by the growth of national consciousness, institutional evolution, and the broader state of affairs between the ‘West' and Russia.
After years of attempting to join NATO and the EU, only to be rebuffed, the political elite now suffers from ‘NATO fatigue.'
With NATO and the EU both unwilling to countenance a timeframe and detailed criteria for joining, Georgia was left exposed to renewed Russian aggression under Putin, demonstrated by the 2008 invasion that, to this day, leaves one-fifth of its internationally recognised sovereign territory under Moscow's control. A similar story unfolded for Ukraine: first, with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and incursion into Donbas, followed by the full-scale invasion in 2022.
In recent years, Georgia, despite the vast majority of its population seeking closer ties with the West, has seen the ruling Georgian Dream party consolidate power and introduce anti-democratic illiberal modes of governance, most notably with the ‘Foreign Influence' Bill that opponents say stifles civil society and is modelled on a similar law in Russia. After years of attempting to join NATO and the EU, only to be rebuffed, the political elite now suffers from ‘NATO fatigue.'
Without the meaningful prospect of joining institutions that could guarantee security, there was a lack of society-wide and pan-political external incentives to continue the democratising reforms required to safeguard Georgian democracy. The risk is that something similar happens in Ukraine. If, after years of brutal conflict, NATO and the EU continue their historic standoffishness, then a war-weary population may understandably have more to concern themselves with than domestic reforms that do not necessarily affect everyday life.
Despite Kyiv and Tbilisi not being pro-Russian, the risk is that Ukraine and Georgia, without democratic safeguards, will have more in common with Russia than they do with Western Europe.
This is not a case of Georgia and Ukraine suddenly falling into the Russian ‘camp,' its ‘sphere of influence,' or even any current or future government being pro-Russian. Centuries of imperialism, as well as more recent warfare (and multiple and severe human rights violations) and occupation, make such notions fanciful. Instead, the risk comes from the possibility of these countries turning to more autocratic means of governance ‘to get things done' in order to coexist with the more powerful neighbour without support from the West. Despite Kyiv and Tbilisi not being pro-Russian, the risk is that Ukraine and Georgia, without democratic safeguards, will have more in common with Russia than they do with Western Europe.
This is not a simple issue: many NATO members are reticent about admitting countries involved in active conflict or territorial disputes with nuclear-armed Russia.
Despite significant democratic progress since the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither Ukraine nor Georgia has sufficiently democratised its institutions to reach strict EU accession criteria. Still, history provides examples of states that have navigated these obstacles through various loopholes and compromises—and, in contrast to Georgia's cautionary tale, Estonia serves as a positive example of what can be achieved.
The West must begin to protect people who wish to live according to the democratic values it claims to support.
However, it's important not to exaggerate commonalities when speaking of comparatives. Linguistically, culturally, and politically, the countries of Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia share very little except for decades of Communist repression during the Cold War (and, historically, centuries of malign Russian aggression).
However, as one of the earliest countries to assert its independence from Moscow, Estonia joined both NATO and the EU in 2004. Since then, Estonia has bolstered its democratic institutions, greatly developed and diversified its economy, and proven itself a valuable ally in the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
This was no accident. Estonia's path to integrating into the West was greatly supported by Western institutions keen to cultivate it (and other Baltic states) as future members, assisting when required and not being overly burdensome in its membership criteria. More than twenty years later, this remains a relevant message that leaders in Western capitals should heed regarding Georgia and Ukraine.
The West must begin to protect people who wish to live according to the democratic values it claims to support. Failure to do so would not only be militarily counterproductive; it would betray the very notions that it is fighting for. Estonia's integration into the West shows what can be done, and I hope to share this message with the widest and most diverse possible audience.
