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Will Russia’s alliance with the global far right survive the war?

New studies indicate that a firm mutual admiration linkage has become fragile. This is hard to reconcile since over the last two decades, during Mr. Putin’s years as Russia’s hard-fisted leader, the far right in the West has enjoyed a close relationship with the Russian state and Russian groups of the same ilk.

This ideological marriage, not perceivable during the cold war, actually makes sense. It’s easy to identify a shared social and cultural conservative ideology, disdain for democratic systems, admiration for tough-guy leadership and appreciation for autocratic style of government. 

Similarities can be drawn on a theoretical basis. But the behaviour of the extreme right in action is visible on the street, and comparisons between the USA and Russia are telling. Which family offshoot is more destructive?

Political violence driven by a far-right credo is substantially more common in Russia than in the West. In a study from 2000 to 2017, annual levels of lethal far-right violence in Russia were five times higher per unit of population than in the USA, and more than seven times higher than in Western Europe. 

Trans-national relationships between bloodshed-prone Russian groups and their Western counterparts have been part of the violent political landscape for years.

In spite of government actions against these violent groups increasing in the late 2000s, pro-Putin vigilante groups and promoters of Russian imperialism didn’t suffer at the hands of the security forces. As expected, such groups were deliberately deployed in fighting the anti-Putin opposition and providing deceptive but credible deniability for the Kremlin. (A somewhat familiar scenario played out elsewhere.)

Trans-national relationships between bloodshed-prone Russian groups and their Western counterparts have been part of the violent political landscape for years. They have been more visible in Serbia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, even in Germany. 

But a less visceral, more intellectual kinship is felt between Putin and ‘legitimate’ far right movements in Europe. Political parties who have gained significant public backing: Front de gauche in France, Die Linke in Germany, Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Front National in France, etc. Politicians in these groups have commended Russia for its actions in Crimea and Ukraine. Viktor Orbán’s regime in Hungary has been called Putin’s ‘Trojan Horse’.

(This same worldview and bold-faced admiration for Russia’s aggression is seen also in far-left groupings in Europe – circumstances that Putin adroitly exploits.) 

The most recent replay of this reciprocal political concurrence was seen in the jubilation in Russia when Holland’s Geert Wilders recently scored an election victory by doubling the size of his party’s presence in parliament. Of the main contenders in the Dutch election, Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom, is the most pro-Russian and this was immediately acknowledged by Russian media. 

Russians knew that The Netherlands have been one of the most loyal allies of Ukraine since the invasion, even leading efforts with Denmark to supply Kyiv with F-16 fighter jets. Wilders, in stark contrast, made his pro-Kremlin stance by praising Putin as “more favourable” than EU leaders and snubbing Wolodymyr Zelenskyy’s speech in the Dutch parliament. 

At the start of the Russian assault in February 2022, most of the Global far right endorsed Russia’s aims…

Sharing the same ideological territory as Holland’s Party for Freedom are 14 far right parties in the EU Parliament. It’s estimated that eight of these parties openly favour Russia and hold 25% of the EU total vote for parliament. This is electoral clout that can’t be dismissed offhand.

At the start of the Russian assault in February 2022, most of the Global far right endorsed Russia’s aims, blaming the USA, and NATO, as well as the UN, for provoking war. Simply put, Russia had no other alternative. But does this have staying power? 

To gain wider public support, some on the far right seem to have shifted their focus from the initial outright support for Moscow to economic anxieties. (Witness the growing anti-Ukraine rhetoric of the GOP on Capitol Hill.) In Europe, rather than debating the merits of the war itself, far-righters are discussing impact of the sanctions on European societies, rather than the effectiveness of the sanctions opposing aggression. In addition, the pro-Russia far left and pro-Russia far right in places are united in a pro-Russia narrative that stresses rising energy prices and cost of living.

In dealing with the complexities of pro/anti Russia allegiances, we cannot ignore some far-right groups who have sided with Ukraine, condemning the bogus “denazification” objective and the destruction of a Western country. Notably the Polish Law and Justice party who came to power in 2015 while articulating an anti-Putin stance as part of its ideology. The Fratelli d’Italia party has strongly criticized Russia during its electoral campaign and distanced itself from Lega, known for its admiration for Putin.

A study of 13,000 roll call votes from 2019 to 2022 in the EU Parliament was conducted to assess changes in ‘assertiveness towards Russia’ of radical rightist parties in the parliament. Votes from before and after the Russian invasion were analyzed and the results were surprising.

Opposition by far-right groups in Europe to Russia’s ambitions in Ukraine varies from mild to severe.

Within the EU parliament, the Polish Law and Justice party and Hungary’s Fidesz were seen to agree on a more critical position towards Russia, in contrast to their pre-invasion pro-Putin stance. (The Hungarian Fidesz EU parliament delegation appears to diverge from its leader, Orbán’s pro-Moscow position.)

In broad strokes, the results indicate that the Russian invasion has narrowed the pre-existing differences among EU far-right parties regarding their attitude towards Moscow. 

Opposition by far-right groups in Europe to Russia’s ambitions in Ukraine varies from mild to severe. This is coupled with the decrease in influence Moscow enjoyed with these parties, pre-invasion.

The picture in Europe is complex, but in Washington it’s straightforward. It’s ironic to note that in the USA, in the face of Russian aggression, most of the GOP’s far right, once the American bastion of anti-Sovietism, is positioning itself as a pro-Kremlin faction within Congress. Ukraine is not a major issue in the current US presidential campaign. Worrisome?

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