But the Russian diaspora is not of one mind in condemning Russian aggression. The Kremlin-opposed turnout was modest in cities such as Paris, London, Berlin, Vilnius, Tbilisi, Belgrade, Milan and elsewhere. The relative apathy of Russian expatriates disappointed pro-democracy activists when parallel Ukrainian rallies were able to muster more sizable anti-Kremlin protesters.
In contrast to this, pro-Kremlin Russians protesting in Europe and North America typically called for a ceasefire, but also an end to military support for Ukraine, a message adopted by some US Republicans and politicians within NATO-EU countries.
It’s apparent that anti-Kremlin groups have not gained sufficient traction to dominate the Russian expatr discourse. But observers feel that the usually disunified political opposition still denies Putin the luxury of showing how all Russians are dedicated to his world-view. Any indication of disloyalty disrupts his game.
When the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, and many of its occupied nations declared or re-established their independence, a Russian diaspora of 25 million was instantly created. At the time Moscow intended to benefit from Russians in neighbouring states in influencing governments to maintain allegiances with Moscow.
A ‘Russkiy Mir’ (Russian World) campaign promoted language and cultural identity intended to strengthen ties with the homeland. Co-ordination Councils of Russian Compatriots (KSORS) are umbrella structures uniting local ex-pat groups in countries of residence. Russian schools, cultural centres, Russian media, clubs, etc., have been are supported by the KSORS, which report to the World Co-ordination Council that takes direction from government agencies.
But Putin’s use of Russians is to augment propaganda and their intel capability. Embassies and representatives of the Federal Agency for CIS, Compatriots living abroad supply financial support and instructions. Added to this is the Russian World Foundation, founded by the Foreign Affairs and Education ministries. In July of 2022 they were put on the EU sanctions list, for justifiable reasons.
As a Soviet intelligence officer running the Dresden USSR-German Democratic House of Friendship, Putin was attuned to the utility of emigrant ‘center’ ties. At the first congress of compatriots in 2001, he plainly stated what’s mandatory – that emigrants must be dedicated to strengthening Russian influence worldwide.
How effective were those emigrants, 25 million of whom were left in the ’near abroad’, mostly in the 11 neighbouring countries that formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with Russia in 1991? After the Russian assault against Georgia in 2008, not a single CIS country recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia because it would have jeopardized its own claim of territorial integrity.
Also in 2008, only six of the 11 CIS states attended the CIS -summit called by Moscow. So much for Russian solid influence through its expats in the CIS at that time.
The SKORS affiliates worldwide were not seen as having any political objectives before the sham Crimea referendum and annexation in 2014. The Russian Foreign Ministry demanded that the US SKORS endorse Russian actions. SKORS refused. The head of the San Francisco Congress of Russian Americans did comply, and soon thereafter was voted in as the US SKORS Chair. This was the pattern with SKORS in other countries – Kremlin-oriented people becoming active within SKORS, some obviously being recruited.
SKORS downgraded cultural and humanitarian activities and morphed into agents of Russian influence and conduits for its propaganda. The head of US SKORS, claiming to represent the American-Russian community, officially supported the Russian annexation of four Ukrainian areas as necessary for Russia to “protect its sovereignty”.
The Russian-American Co-operation Initiative (ACI) youth group, co-ordinator of Seattle’s May 9 “Immortal Regiment” commemorations, organized Russian army fundraisers in 2022. The ACI has actively supported Trump through its Facebook group “Russian-Speaking Americans for Law and Order”. The ACI website is currently inactive, but still being used by the Russian American Daily in publishing pro-Kremlin content.
The head of the American University in Moscow, who once ‘escaped’ to the US as a Soviet dissident in 1970, now fully supports Putin’s policies, blaming Biden for escalating the conflict. He has been collecting and sharing statements from Republican politicians and declares: “I wish Putin were the president of America.”
Defections from some pro-Kremlin organizations after the invasion have been noticed. But what spurred them has varied. Some openly oppose the war and have openly disassociated themselves from groups such as KSORS. But not all have split for ideological or idealistic reasons. For many it was a self-preservation response, not to enjoy the same destiny as their colleagues, being deported from their new, Western, safe country of choice. Are they truly disaffected? They’ve made a readjustment, withdrawn from public scrutiny, so as not to harm their careers or disrupt family lifestyles.
In stark contrast, other Russians groups in the West have urged joint efforts with Ukrainians. These include the Free Russian Foundation, the Anti-Corruption Foundation and others. In Canada the Russian Canadian Association and the Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance advocate similar ideas.
They manifest a deep sense of guilt for the actions of their native country. They own a moral obligation not to remain silently on the sidelines. They also sense their own privileged existence when compared with possible dangers facing those that oppose Putin inside Russia.
Which segment of Russian ex-pats has the ear of Western decision-makers? Up to now, the authentic fighters for democracy and Ukrainian freedom. But the pro-Kremlin proxies are making inroads that can’t be ignored.
