He was considered to be in contact with British intelligence and a formal dossier was opened, recording the ongoing surveillance /investigation of the subject. The dossier has not been preserved in Estonia but extensive references to it in the KGB's annual reports make the contents an interesting open secret.
Of special concern for the KGB was Stillverk's correspondence with Alma Aulio in Helsinki, whose husband was known to have been a counter-intelligence operative for Finland during WWII and who was suspected of still working for various Western intelligence agencies. Compounding this was information from the KGB agent “Saar” who was known to be Alma Aulio's cousin, that Finnish diplomats regularly deliver letters by hand-mail to Stillverk. Surveillance was intensified to include physical surveillance, intercepting of mail, electronic surveillance both at home and his workplace. He was also followed on his trip to Leningrad and Moscow in 1968.
No hard evidence was uncovered. It was however established, through intercepted mail, his abhorrence of the Soviet system. In his letters to Alma Aulio he deeply regretted the decision to return to Estonia and was extremely critical of Russians and the Soviets. In conversations with KGB agents “Tammur” and “Sarapuu” he repeated the same sentiments. Also working the Stillverk file were colleague pastors “Jüri” and “Ego” who kept the KGB updated on the interest shown by Estonian pastors in the West about the well-being of Stillverk. This of course increased the concern of the KGB and an agent “Sulg” was especially tasked in 1957 with becoming a close confidant of Stillverk.
Stillverk was forced to write articles for the newspaper “Kodumaale tagasipöördumise eest” (“For returning to the homeland”) which was distributed to Estonians in the West. His stories praised church life in Soviet-occupied Estonian – diametrically contradicting his own personal evaluation of the actual situation. Those who have studied the KGB annual reports are convinced that there were hundreds of KGB repatriated targets such as Stillverk who were subjected to intensive scrutiny by the KGB.
(“Kodumaale tagasipöördumise eest” was initially published by Estonian communists in East Berlin and distributed to Estonian refugees in German displaced persons camps. It depicted a wildly distorted heavenly picture of Soviet controlled Estonia and was meant as an incentive for those considering repatriation. It was the fore-runner to “Kodumaa” (“Homeland”), for decades published in Tallinn and meant for Estonians who had fled to the West. It was a part of the propaganda effort of VEKSA- the Committee for developing cultural ties with Estonians abroad. VEKSA was an asset of Estonia's State Security Committee.)
(Sidebar: “Kodumaa” was mailed to Estonians living abroad. Nobody subscribed to it, but very few families were not on the circulation list. It is said that if someone moved, it took minimal time for “Kodumaa” to arrive at the new address's mailbox. Ontario, in fact probably all jurisdictions in Canada, do not require by law to have the police or central government departments be notified of the change of address for individuals (this excludes specific documents such as IDs, drivers' licences etc.). It would seem then that the “Kodumaa” administration had a network of people abroad assisting them in such administrative matters.)
The KGB counter-intelligence annual reports of 1956 and 1957 carried ample information about the KGB officials assigned to the repatriation program in Estonia. One of the agency's workers was assigned full time to head up the repatriated persons' file. During the year he visited repatriates throughout the country as well as interviewed people with relatives abroad. During these contacts he solicited appropriate articles for the “Kodumaale tagasipöördumise eest” newspaper. Assisting him were two ‘trustees' (both repatriants) and three agents (two of whom were repatriants). The agents had covers as journalists for the newspaper, which allowed them to actively pursue soliciting articles while conducting surveillance surreptitiously.
Numerous ‘trustees' and agents (exact numbers unknown) were recruited from amongst the repatriated. They had no qualms about informing on their own kind. Some were specifically qualified to be used in assisting foreign intelligence assignments by speaking several languages, having developed relationships with foreign military officers (especially US), being familiar with foreign customs etc.
(to be continued)
Laas Leivat
